

Oracle Database Attack Surface Reduction

An Oracle Consulting Services - Security Workshop

Daniel Morgan

Technical Director Database Security
Oracle Consulting Services

November 15, 2023





Agenda


Introduction

Ransomware

Dual Use

Secure Configuration

Attack Surface Reduction Assessments



daniel.d.morgan@oracle.com

Oracle Professional Services, Technical Director, Database and Cloud Security



Member, Oracle Security Tiger Team



Oracle ACE Director Alumnus

- Educator
 - Mashington, Oracle Program, 1998-2009
 - **W** Oracle Consultant: Harvard University
 - Guest lecturer at universities and colleges in Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, US
 - Frequent conference speaker ... OpenWorld + 151 country visits in 47 countries, since 2008
 - @NYOUG 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
- IT Professional
 - Member Oracle Database Security Partner Advisory Council 2019-2021
 - The Morgan behind www.morganslibrary.org and www.dbsecworx.com
 - Founding Chair Washington Software Association's Database Special Interest Group
 - Oracle Database and Database Beta Tester since 1988-9



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UNCCT » Programmes and projects » Cybersecurity and New Technologies

Cybersecurity and New Technologies



























No Matter Our Customer's Infrastructure Sector

CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY



AMERICA'S CYBER DEFENSE AGENCY




























We Must Be Able To Support Our Customer's Security Initiatives









Not Just For PII and PHI but for DFARS, EAR, ITAR, and






Access Controls: Account Management



Principle of Least Privilege is more than system and object privileges


Principle of Least Privilege is also Database Profiles and Consumer Groups






Our Beta Partner and Reference

A "small" aerospace company with security issues very similar to yours





Ransomware



Oracle Database Ransomware Risk

Ransomware is a plague impacting a wide variety of IT environments with many accepting that there is little they can do outside of standard protocols related to perimeter defense and

For the Orac the risk by for the risk by for the orac the or

minimize

Safe *

The risk protection of the pro

how different components can be installed and configured to reduce the attack surface


* Oracle cannot guarantee that future attacks will not include ASM but, to date, there is no known successful attack on raw disk managed with Oracle ASM

Data Files	ASM & ZFS
Control Files	ASM & ZFS
Redo Log Files	ASM & ZFS
Archived Redo Log Files	ASM & ZFS
Standby Redo Logs	ASM & ZFS
Server Parameter File (SPFILE)	ASM & ZFS
Password File	ASM & ZFS
RMAN Backup Files	ASM & ZFS
Wallet and Key Vault (OKV)	ASM & ZFS



Dual-Use






Evaluating Risk

Should Oracle Database 24c include a new feature that would allow PUBLIC to:


- run a query
- attach the results to an email
- send the email to a foreign intelligence agency?



Would You Change Your Mind If It Was On IBM Mainframes?




On IBM AS400s?




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
In IBM DB2 on Linux, Unix and Windows?



In SAP Sybase?




In MongoDB?






In Snowflake?




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In Microsoft SQL Server and the Azure Cloud?



In Amazon Redshift and the AWS Cloud?



Dual-Use Technology has been in our Database for 30+ years



Simple Example of Sending Attachments Using UTL SMTP (Doc ID 414062.1)

Last updated on FEBRUARY 03, 2022

APPLIES TO:

PL/SQL - Version 10.1.0.2 and later Information in this document applies to any platform.

GOAL

How to send an E-Mail with attachment using the PL/SQL package UTL_SMTP. The sample code uses the DBMS_LOB package to open and read the given file and encodes the attachment using UTL_ENCODE package to base64 format. This method will work with most types of file, but you will need to modify the mime type as noted in the code comments.

Dual-Use Technology Examples

Category	Example
Exfiltration: File System	CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE DBMS_ADVISOR.CREATE_FILE DBMS_DATAPUMP.OPEN DBMS_LOB.CLOB2FILE DBMS_XMLDOM.WRITETOFILE DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR.CLOB2FILE JVMFCB.PUT UTL_FILE.PUT_LINE
Exfiltration: TCP/IP Network	DBMS_AQELM DBMS_DATAPUMP DBMS_DEBUG_JDWP.CONNECT_TCP UTL_SMTP.OPEN_CONNECTION UTL_TCP.OPEN_CONNECTION
Reconnaissance	OEM RMAN UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME
SQL Rewrite	DBMS_ADANCED_REWRITE DBMS_SQLDIAG DBMS_SQL_TRANSLATION



Demos Live in SQL*Plus

One of these exploits was demonstrated at Blackhat 2005.


The other has been published in at least 2 books: One by Oracle Press.

These are not bugs any more than macros in Microsoft Excel are bugs ...

these are examples of dual-use functionality that can be easily blocked and monitored.



Secure Configuration



A Few Important Points Before We Get Started

Everything you are about to see in this section relates to an emergent threat or a "recommended practice" that will assist you in reducing the attack surface of your Oracle Databases

We are sharing this information with you so that you can better protect your data, your databases, and your organization

In doing so, it is not our goal to make computing more dangerous, so please treat this information appropriately and do not share it outside of your IT and Security groups

Every capability and remediation I will show is available in Enterprise Edition and does not require use of any additional options or products



Who Is Responsible for Secure Configuration (1:3)

The Oracle Database on installation can be configured to be the most secure enterprise ready commercial database but, by default, the majority of the database's security features are

configured for maximum backward compatibility

Let's go back more than 30 years to look at two examples that demonstrate that it is DBAs that must configure database security

Database Profile

Think of the Logical Reads and other DB Profile resources as privileges that should be granted based on the Principle of Least Privilege:

UNLIMITED is not the smallest

ALTER PROFILE was created to provide customers


the ability to modify kernel resource limits based on the needs of the applications and, as Oracle doesn't know that requirement, set them at the time of installation at the highest level




Who Is Responsible for Secure Configuration (2:3)

Privilege Grants

For more than 30 years the Oracle Database has enabled MFA to password protect escalated privileges from abuse: Oracle cannot know what roles, requiring what privileges, for every application purchased or built by every one of its customers






Again, the syntax supports our customers customizing configuration to meet their needs



Who Is Responsible for Secure Configuration (3:3)



IAM: Oracle Identity and Access Management



Authentication

It is not unusual to find Oracle 19c databases that have been upgraded version-after-version for decades with legacy users and configurations impacting current security.

The user accounts highlighted bypass central user management (LDAP) and violate Zero Trust and compliance frameworks like CIS

Found in a Password File						
USERNAME	ACCOU	NT_STATUS	PASSWORD_P	ROFILE	AUTHENTI	
C##QK435	E OPEN		DEFAULT		PASSWORD	
SYS	OPEN		DEFAULT		PASSWORD	
SYSBACKU	P LOCKE		DEFAULT		PASSWORD	
SYSDG	LOCKE)	DEFAULT		PASSWORD	
SYSKM	LOCKE)	DEFAULT		PASSWORD	
Default Users with Default Passwords						
CON ID USERNAME ACCOUNT STATUS						
5	5 PERFSTAT Locked					
5 SCOTT Locked						
5	MTSSYS	OPEN				
5	SYSMAN	OPEN				
5	EDPMGR	OPEN: passw	ord matches	default fo	or MGR	
5	IF USER	OPEN: passw	ord matches	default fo	or matches	USER

Externally Authenticated Users
GRANTEE
AK946BDBA
C##DBOCOPS
C##OPS\$ORACLE
C##QK435E
COMPDBA
DBOCOPS
KI739D
OPS\$ORACLE
OPS\$ORADBA
PK750E
SYSMAN



Central User Management

Most medium to large enterprises deploy LDAP and similar solutions to simplify user management. These systems may employ Oracle products or third-party solutions such as CyberArk and Microsoft Active Directory

What they all have in common is a database configuration vulnerability that can be exploited by a sophisticated attack and which Oracle Consulting can address through a *Consulting Configuration Extension*

What all CMU solutions have in common is that the database must be configured to validate a connection outside of the database and the local operating system

```
CREATE USER safeadmin IDENTIFIED GLOBALLY AS 'cn=safeadmin,cn=Users,dc=dbsecworx,dc=com'; and it is this requirement that provides an opportunity to prevent exploitation
```

If you are interested in learning more about this Extension, please ask and we would be happy to set up a separate workshop to explain how it works



Authentication Attack Surface Reduction Report

Regularly monitor the Oracle Database password file for inappropriate entries

Regularly monitor C

Regularly monitor C authenticated by pa

Regularly monitor C

Performing a manuatime-to-time to veri System.

If you do not strictly observe recommended authentication security practices, internal users and users with phished credentials can bypass your Centrally Managed User controls and log in with escalated privileges even if they have been removed from the

and SYSTEM

words

ve conditions from system, triggers an

alert captured by your security team, and that the DBA team is alerted to the violation and has a standard protocol for addressing the issue



Exfiltration

A majority of database break-ins require exfiltration, a way to successfully get stolen data off of the victim's premises, and one of the most common is writing it to a file system in a way that won't be observed or detected: This will require that they gain access to TCP/IP network or a file system

As an Oracle professional you are likely to immediately think of the UTL_FILE built-in package and it is for that reason, that you'd think about it, that it is likely a serious professional would decide not to use it but instead use other built-in tools

Exfiltration Options that should be on your radar

- CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE
- DBMS_ADVISOR
- DBMS_LOB
- DBMS_XMLDOM
- DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR
- JVMFCB
- UTL_FILE

Time to exfiltrate 200	,000 lines of source code	e from SYS.SOURCE\$
	, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	5 5 5 . 5 5

Package	Procedure	File Size (MB)	Run Time (sec.)
UTL_FILE	PUT_LINE	13.4	07.33
DBMS_ADVISOR	CREATE_FILE	16.1	01.04
DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR	CLOB2FILE	15.8	00.93



Exfiltration Attack Surface Reduction Report

What all of these attacks, except one, have in common:

- Require privileges to use a DIRECTORY object
- CREATE TABLE privilege is almost universally ignored as a security risk
- Built-in packages have EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC
- Our customers do not require security authorizations for their use
- Creation and use are rarely audited and, if in the audit trail, do not raise an alarm

A database user with access to DBMS_XSLPROCESSOR can write your data and your source code to disk at more than 200,000 lines per second.

Audit the grants and actions related to these exploits, both successful and unsuccessful

Educate your internal auditors about the associated risks and develop an action plan for how to respond if misuse is detected



Rewrite Vulnerabilities

Many of our customers use end-point monitoring and firewalls to detect database accesses that fit a defined risk profile. Attackers know this and look for ways to use existing SQL to bypass detection: One way they do it is through rewrite which transforms SQL inside the database's memory

The following rewrite options should be on your radar

Package	Procedure	Risk
DBMS_ADVANCED_REWRITE	DECLARE_REWRITE_EQUIVALENCE	Can refactor a SQL statement inside the optimizer
DBMS_SQLDIAG	CREATE_SQL_PATCH	Can add hints to existing SQL creating a Denial-of-Service attack
DBMS_SQL_TRANSLATION	REGISTER_SQL_TRANSLATION	Can refactor a SQL statement inside the optimizer



Rewrite Vulnerability Examples

DBMS_ADVANCED_REWRITE (version 10.1) stealing data

DBMS_SQL_TRANSLATOR (version 12.1) generating data corruption

```
exec dbms_sql_translator.register_sql_translation(
   profile_name => 'GF_TSQLTRANS',
   sql_text => 'SELECT srvr_id INTO gf.tsql_target FROM gf.servers',
   translated_text => 'INSERT INTO gf.tsql_target SELECT srvr_id FROM gf.servers');
```

DBMS_SQLDIAG (version 12.2) creating a DDOS attack

```
SELECT /*+ FULL(mr) NO_INDEX(mr.pk_med_records) NO_PARALLEL */ patient_name
FROM med_records mr
WHERE mr.transaction# = 999999991;
```



REWRITE Attack Surface Reduction Report

Oracle has used a variety of techniques to protect our customers from these attacks, but you

must be aware of the risks and how to detect and prevent them

DBMS ADVAN

Rewrite attacks are, by definition, not detectable Audit all grant by end-point, tripwire, or firewall technologies.

cutions of ION

They can only be prevented or detected by DBAs as sys. sums managing securely configured environments.

or changes such

Monitor system privilege grants such as **EXECUTE**, **EXECUTE** ANY, ALTER ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE, CREATE ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE, TRANSLATE ANY SQL and USE ANY SQL TRANSLATION PROFILE

Educate your internal auditors about the associated risks and develop an action plan for how to respond if misuse is detected



DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN (1:2)

By default, a user with the **CREATE [ANY] DATABASE LINK** privilege can create a link to any database they wish because, by default, trust administration is set to **ALLOW ALL**

With our focus these days on Zero Trust it may be a bit disheartening to know that every database in your enterprise has Distributed Trust configured to **ALLOW ALL**, but this default was established more than 30 years ago when security was not the issue it is today

Oracle realized this was a security risk and, with backward compatibility in mind, released the fully documented DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN package in 9.0.1 to allow customers to change the default to $DENY_ALL$ and then grant permissions for database links on a host-by-host basis

```
(MM/DD/YY)
       MODIFIED
Rem
                   02/26/19 - bug 29442500: pragma for dbms rolling
      hmohanku
Rem
                   12/29/13 - 13922626: Update SQL metadata
Rem
       surman
                   03/27/12 - 13615447: Add SQL patching tags
Rem
       surman
                   05/24/01 - CREATE OR REPLACE SYNONYM
       gviswana
Rem
      nlewis
                   04/22/97 - fix description
Rem
                   03/19/97 - change name of package
       nlewis
Rem
       ibellemo
                   11/10/96 - Creation
Rem
       jbellemo
                   11/10/96 - Created
Rem
```



DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN (2:2)

Look at how Distributed Trust is currently configured: Likely to ALLOW ALL (+*)

```
        SELECT * FROM trusted_list$;

        DBNAME
        USERNAME

        -----+*
        *
```

Reduce the attack surface by updating Trust Administration to DENY_ALL (-*)

Then create an ALLOW statement for specific servers as required



TRUST ADMIN Attack Surface Reduction Report

The DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN package is owned by SYS with EXECUTE granted to the EXECUTE CATALOG ROLE role

White-listing servers and hosts will reduce the likelihood The EXECU that an attacker with access to a low priority database will IMP_FULL_use that footbold to tuppel into a higher priority system. use that foothold to tunnel into a higher priority system.

SE and istration

Revoke the grant of EXECUTE from EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE and grant it explicitly to schemas that require it

Audit all grants of EXECUTE for DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN Audit all executions of DBMS_DISTRIBUTED_TRUST_ADMIN, both successful and unsuccessful Audit all database links is required and drop all database links that are no long in use

Update Distributed Trust to DENY_ALL and execute ALLOW_SERVER statements for servers to which database links are required



Data-in-Motion Encryption (1:2)

The overwhelming majority of SQLNET.ORA files we see look like one of the following

```
NAMES.DIRECTORY PATH= (TNSNAMES, EZCONNECT)
NAMES.DEFAULT DOMAIN
                               = zzyzx.com
NAMES.DIRECTORY PATH
                               = (LDAP, TNSNAMES, EZCONNECT)
NAMES.REQUEST RETRIES
SQLNET.EXPIRE TIME
                               = 0
SQLNET.INBOUND CONNECT TIMEOUT = 250
SQLNET.ALLOWED LOGON VERSION CLIENT=8
SQLNET.ALLOWED LOGON VERSION SERVER=8
WALLET LOCATION =
  (SOURCE = (METHOD = File)
    (METHOD DATA =
      (DIRECTORY = /oradba/app/oracle/admin/cde01p65/wallet)))
```

Note the complete lack of encryption



Data-in-Motion Encryption (2:2)

What we would like to see as it is included in every customer's existing license agreement

```
NAMES.DIRECTORY PATH=(TNSNAMES, EZCONNECT)
SQLNET.EXPIRE TIME=10
SQLNET.CRYPTO CHECKSUM TYPES CLIENT=(SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA1)
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION SERVER=REQUESTED
SQLNET.CRYPTO CHECKSUM SERVER=ACCEPTED
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION TYPES SERVER= (AES256, AES192, AES128)
SQLNET.IGNORE ANO ENCRYPTION FOR TCPS=TRUE
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION CLIENT=REQUESTED
SQLNET.ENCRYPTION TYPES CLIENT=(AES256, AES192, AES128)
SQLNET.CRYPTO CHECKSUM CLIENT=ACCEPTED
HTTPS SSL VERSION=1.2
SSL VERSION=1.2
SSL CIPHER SUITES=(SSL ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256, SSL ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA38
4, SSL ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256, SSL ECDHE RSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384)
WALLET LOCATION= (SOURCE= (METHOD=FILE)
                         (METHOD DATA=(DIRECTORY=/var/opt/oracle/dbaas acfs/grid/tcps wallets)))
SQLNET.WALLET OVERRIDE=FALSE
SSL CLIENT AUTHENTICATION=FALSE
```

This is part of the reason the OCI Cloud has a higher level of security than most customer environments (this is the default configuration for Oracle Exadata Cloud@Customer)



rough

allows

node

Valid Node Checking

When we think about the concept of Principle of Least Privilege, we often accept the narrowest possible definition of the term

Allowing conn

Without Valid Node Checking your databases can be 255.255.255 compromised by anyone with valid credentials or an attack on your Identity Management system.

Valid Node Ch

Valid Node Checking adds an additional factor that requires knowledge that cannot be phished.

- Eliminates complex COST* setups to ensure malicious servers do not register with a listener

```
VALID NODE CHECKING REGISTRATION LISTENER=ON
TCP.INVITED NODES=(appserver.us.oracle.com, 144.185.5.*, 10.3.0.4)
```

A newer version, Valid Node Checking for Registration (VNCR), requires that RAC nodes originate only from a list of known, white-listed, IP addresses



^{*} Class Of Secure Transport

Valid Node Checking Attack Surface Reduction Report

Multi-Factor Authentication should mean "multiple factors" and should not be limited to the generic and predictable such as userid, password, and a token

The Oracle Database supports additional factors the majority of which do not require changes in application coding or an additional burden on human users

Valid Node Checking can transparently restrict logins to only application servers, monitoring applications (for example OEM), RAC cluster nodes, and specific individuals with escalated privileges allowing using a limited number of approved desktops or jump servers



Password Rollover

A new password resource has been added to Database Profiles that makes it possible to eliminate all downtime associated with changing application database passwords

It is not unusual for an application password change to require an extended outage while application servers are reconfigured with the new password

PASSWORD_ROLLOVER_TIME, makes it possible to access a database schema simultaneously, with two different passwords (both old and new), while password changes are taking place

At the end of the rollover time the old password is automatically invalidated

Released in 21c, Backported to 19.12

```
SELECT profile, limit
FROM dba profiles
WHERE resource name = 'PASSWORD ROLLOVER TIME';
PROFILE
                                LIMIT
DEFAULT
ORA CIS PROFILE
ORA STIG PROFILE
                                DEFAULT
ALTER PROFILE ora cis profile LIMIT password rollover time 3;
Profile altered.
SELECT profile, limit
FROM dba profiles
WHERE resource name = 'PASSWORD ROLLOVER TIME';
PROFILE
                                LIMIT
DEFAULT
ORA CIS PROFILE
ORA STIG PROFILE
                                DEFAULT
```



Password Rollover Attack Surface Reduction Report

Setting and using Password Rollover Time makes it possible to alter application passwords, enterprise-wide, without a loss of service

Password management rules for applications and service accounts can be brought in line with rules and regulations governing all passwords with respect to change frequency and reuse

Failure to regularly change passwords ...
Failure to change passwords after key personnel changes ...
Are known causes for a substantial percentage of breaches.

Using the new Password Rollover feature means that password changes for complex system no longer require a loss of service.



Unified Auditing (1:2)

Unified Auditing Policies were introduced in 12c and are a substantial enhancement of Oracle's Legacy auditing simplifying maintenance costs minimizing coverage gaps, and reducing risk

The enhancement that makes the new policy-based auditing ideal for DBAs is the ability to build a single policy that addresses the organization's needs

```
CREATE AUDIT POLICY <policy_name>
[PRIVILEGES <comma_delimited_system_privileges_list>]
[<standard_actions | component_actions>]
[ROLES <comma_delimited_roles_list>]
[WHEN '<audit_condition>' EVALUATE PER <STATEMENT | SESSION | INSTANCE>]
[ONLY TOPLEVEL]
[CONTAINER = <ALL | CURRENT>];
```

Oracle provides audit policies that can be enabled with every database installation in the file **\$ORACLE_HOME/rdbms/admin/secconf.sql** which includes policy recommendations for CIS and STIG compliance



Unified Auditing (2:2)

```
'CREATE AUDIT POLICY ORA STIG RECOMMENDATIONS '||
        'PRIVILEGES ALTER SESSION '||
           'ACTIONS CREATE FUNCTION, ALTER FUNCTION, DROP FUNCTION, ' ||
                   'CREATE PACKAGE, ALTER PACKAGE, DROP PACKAGE, ' | |
                   'CREATE PROCEDURE, ALTER PROCEDURE, DROP PROCEDURE, ' ||
                   'CREATE TRIGGER, ALTER TRIGGER, DROP TRIGGER, ' ||
                   'CREATE PACKAGE BODY, ALTER PACKAGE BODY, ' ||
                   'DROP PACKAGE BODY, ' ||
                   'CREATE TYPE, ALTER TYPE, DROP TYPE, ' ||
                   'CREATE TYPE BODY, ALTER TYPE BODY, DROP TYPE BODY, ' ||
                   'CREATE LIBRARY, ALTER LIBRARY, DROP LIBRARY, ' ||
                   'CREATE JAVA, ALTER JAVA, DROP JAVA, ' ||
                   'CREATE OPERATOR, ALTER OPERATOR, DROP OPERATOR, ' ||
                   'CREATE TABLE, ALTER TABLE, DROP TABLE, ' ||
                   'CREATE VIEW, ALTER VIEW, DROP VIEW, ' ||
                   'CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW, ALTER MATERIALIZED VIEW, ' ||
                   'DROP MATERIALIZED VIEW, ' ||
                   'CREATE ASSEMBLY, ALTER ASSEMBLY, DROP ASSEMBLY, ' ||
                   'CREATE SYNONYM, ALTER SYNONYM, DROP SYNONYM, ' ||
                   'CREATE USER, ALTER USER, DROP USER, ' ||
                   'GRANT, REVOKE, ' ||
                   'CREATE ROLE, ALTER ROLE, DROP ROLE, SET ROLE, ' ||
                   'CREATE PROFILE, ALTER PROFILE, DROP PROFILE, ' ||
                   'CREATE LOCKDOWN PROFILE, ALTER LOCKDOWN PROFILE, ' ||
                   'DROP LOCKDOWN PROFILE, ' ||
                   'ALTER SYSTEM, ALTER DATABASE, ALTER PLUGGABLE DATABASE,'||
                   'CREATE SPFILE, ALTER DATABASE DICTIONARY, ' ||
                   'ADMINISTER KEY MANAGEMENT, ' ||
                   'EXECUTE ON DBMS JOB, EXECUTE ON DBMS RLS, ' ||
                   'EXECUTE ON DBMS REDACT, EXECUTE ON DBMS TSDP MANAGE, ' ||
                   'EXECUTE ON DBMS TSDP PROTECT, ' ||
                   'EXECUTE ON DBMS NETWORK ACL ADMIN, ' || 'EXECUTE ON DBMS SCHEDULER ' ||
            'ACTIONS COMPONENT = OLS ALL';
```

Unified Auditing Attack Surface Reduction Report

Auditing cannot reduce the attack surface but eliminating errors and omissions in auditing is critical not just to meet compliance objects but so as to no leave gaps that might allow an attacker unmonitored access

Unified Audit Policies make possible

- Writing a single policy, or small group of policies and implementing them enterprise-wide
- Testing audit policies at the enterprise-level
- A substantially reduction in management costs


Policy based Unified Auditing increases your security through ease of deployment, ease of management, and gap elimination.

Oracle Database legacy ("basic") auditing is approaching end of life.


To be ready for your next upgrade complete your move to Unified Auditing in 19c.



Wrap Up



If You Don't Want To Be On One Of My Slides ...



Attack Surface Reduction Assessments

This Workshop addresses only 15 of more than 800 configuration-related vulnerabilities and practices that directly impact your ability to thwart an attempt to compromise your databases llectual property

and corrupt or exfil Assessments are targeted by Oracle Version

12c, 19c, 21c

Attack Surface Redu requirements of the as our nation's adv providing a service provided to boat ov

by architecture

Stand-alone, RAC, Container, Hadoop, Graph

by Application

EBS, SAP, PeopleSoft, Siebel

by Compliance Requirements

SOX, GDPR, GLB, DFARS, ITAR, EARS, CIS, STIG You know that you weak foundation and that the best door is not secure

if it isn't locked

Our goal, through assessments, is to enable our customers to move from Zero Trust to a foundation built on a security-optimized configuration

his year meets the nize applications ustomers ent service



Assessment Value

Attack Surface Reduction assessments provide a unique value our customers require. An assessment encapsulates Oracle Consulting's unique knowledge of the Oracle Database integrated with the knowledge of members of Oracle's Security Tiger Team, Product Management, Developers and Support



Assessment Reports, unlike compliance frameworks such as CIS and STIG, are flexible and dynamic and address zero-day and emergent threats as we become aware of them

ASR assessments allow adding, altering, and dropping what is collected, how it is analyzed, and the conclusions that are reported based on current knowledge of editions, versions, patch levels, what is happening in the wild, and active research in our environments and labs

Unlike tools and assessments made available for public download, ASR data collection and recommendation mapping is proprietary so that information about potential vulnerabilities is not made available to attackers

Metadata Collection

What

- Identifying information: The minimum required to identify the assessment target
- Database configuration files and metadata (never application data)

How

- Manual input from written and oral questions
- Customer runs a single script provided by Oracle and can review and mask output

Use

- Collected files and metadata analyzed by an Expert System and OCS subject matter experts
- Our algorithms, and your files and metadata, are not shared inside of Oracle

Deliverables

- Executive Summary Report with actionable recommendations
- Technical Detail Report with specific findings and recommended remediation

Destruction

• All files and metadata collected from clients is destroyed at the conclusion of an assessment engagement unless a customer specifically requests that they be retained




Metadata Collection Examples (1:2)

```
WITH t AS (SELECT ct.con id, ct.owner, ct.tablespace name, COUNT(*) AS USE COUNT
          FROM cdb tables ct
          WHERE ct.tablespace name IN ('SYSTEM', 'SYSAUX')
          AND (ct.con id, ct.owner) NOT IN (SELECT cu.con id, cu.username FROM cdb users cu WHERE cu.oracle maintained = 'Y')
          GROUP BY ct.con id, ct.owner, ct.tablespace name), p AS (SELECT ctp.con id, ctp.table owner, ctp.tablespace name, COUNT(*) AS USE COUNT
          FROM cdb tab partitions ctp
          WHERE ctp.tablespace name
          AND (ctp.con_id, ctp.tab: Capture scripts and outputs that are easy
          GROUP BY ctp.con id, ctp
                                                                                                                 space name, COUNT(*) AS USE COUNT
          WHERE ctp.tablespace_name for your team to review, run, and sanitize.
          AND (ctp.con id, ctp.tab)
          GROUP BY ctp.con_id, ctp.table_owner, ctp.tablespace name), i AS (SELECT ci.con id, ci.owner, ci.tablespace name, COUNT(*) AS USE COUNT
          FROM cdb indexes ci
          WHERE ci.tablespace name IN ('SYSTEM', 'SYSAUX')
          AND (ci.con id, ci.owner) NOT IN (SELECT cu.con id, cu.username FROM cdb users cu WHERE cu.oracle maintained = 'Y')
          GROUP BY ci.con id, ci.owner, ci.tablespace name)
SELECT 'S70'||','|| t.con id ||','|| 'TABLE' ||','|| t.owner ||','|| t.tablespace name ||','|| t.use count ||','|| '1.0.2.C' ||','|| SYSTIMESTAMP
FROM t
UNION ALL
SELECT 'S70 '||','|| p.con id ||','|| 'PARTITION' ||','|| p.table owner ||','|| p.tablespace name ||','|| p.use count ||','|| '1.0.2.C' ||','|| SYSTIMESTAMP
FROM p
UNION ALL
SELECT 'S70' ||','|| s.con id ||','|| 'SUBPARTITION' ||','|| s.table owner ||','|| s.tablespace name ||','|| s.use count||','||'1.0.2.C' ||','|| SYSTIMESTAMP
UNION ALL
SELECT 'S70' ||','|| i.con id ||','|| 'INDEXES' ||','|| i.owner ||','|| i.tablespace name ||','|| i.use count ||','|| '1.0.2.C' ||','|| SYSTIMESTAMP
FROM i;
S04,1,1,ssl wallet,,0.9.8.C,29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
S04,1,1,db ultra safe,OFF,0.9.8.C,29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
S04,1,1,encrypt new tablespaces,CLOUD ONLY,0.9.8.C,29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
S04,1,1,db securefile,PREFERRED,0.9.8.C,29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
S04,1,1,1dap directory access, NONE, 0.9.8.C, 29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
S04,1,1,1dap directory sysauth,no,0.9.8.C,29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
S04,1,1,sec case sensitive logon,TRUE,0.9.8.C,29-JUN-22 04.26.09.072882 PM -05:00
```

Deliverables

Executive Summary Report



Overview & actionable recommendations Audience: CTO, CISO, CFO

Technical Details Report



Findings & recommended remediation Audience: DBA, System & App Admins

Detail Report Grading

Findings are graded as belonging to one of three categories in a format similar to the following to assist in making findings actionable

CONFIGURATION COMPONENT	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3
Item 1			
Item 2			
Item 3			
Item 4			
Item 5			
Item 6			
Item 7			
Item 8			
Item 9			

Parameter	Finding
Insecure Configuration	10
Options Available	8
Secure Configuration	9



Report Example: STARTUP PARAMETERS

LOB_SIGNATURE_ENABLED: is a new feature in 19c and adds an additional layer of security to BLOB and CLOB columns: Set to TRUE to decrease the attack surface

MAX_IDLE_TIME: number of idle minutes before a session is automatically terminated. 0 = unlimited. Setting a value such as 60 provides a slight decrease in the attack surface

ONE_STEP_PLUGIN_FOR_PDB_WITH_TDE: set to TRUE eliminate the need to manually provide a

keystore password when importing TDE keys after a move


QUERY_REWRITE_ENABLED: enables/disables query rewrite globally for the database. Disabling provides a slight decrease in the attack surface

RECYCLEBIN: provides a safety margin against corruption by enabling many flashback technologies but dropped tables and indexes can be recovered and mined for data. We recommend the ON configuration but that active measures be taken to ensure sensitive data is not left in the recyclebin or be secured with Database Vault

Parameter	Finding
listener_networks	Not Defined
lob_signature_enable	Not Defined
local_listener	Defined
max_idle_time	0
one_step_plugin_for_pdb_with_tde	FALSE
os_roles	FALSE
query_rewrite_enabled	TRUE
query_rewrite_integrity	ENFORCED
recyclebin	ON


For live delivery of this complimentary presentation to your organization email me asra_us@oracle.com

Oracle Consulting Services - Security Practice
Daniel Morgan, Technical Director Database Security
daniel.d.morgan@oracle.com




Questions

Oracle Consulting Services - Security Practice
Daniel Morgan, Technical Director Database Security
daniel.d.morgan@oracle.com



Thank you

Oracle Consulting Services - Security Practice
Daniel Morgan, Technical Director Database Security
daniel.d.morgan@oracle.com



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